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1. Introduction 
On the afternoon of 6th May 2010, the US equity markets underwent an extraordinary upheaval. In 
about 10 minutes, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped by over 600 points representing the 
disappearance of around 800bn dollars of market value. In the course of this sudden downturn, the 
share-prices of several blue-chip multinational companies went crazy – shares in companies that 
had been a few tens of dollars plummeted to $0.01 in some instances, and rocketed to values over 
$100,000.00 in others.  
As suddenly as this market downturn occurred, it reversed; over the next few minutes most of the 
loss was recovered. Share prices returned to levels within a few percentage points of the values 
they had held before the crash. This ‘Flash Crash’ sparked a major enquiry into its causes by the 
CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) and the SEC (Securities Exchange 
Commission). 
Various theories were discussed in the five months that it took to produce the final report on the 
events of May 6th (CFTC&SEC, 2010).  Many speculated on the role of high-frequency trading 
(HFT) by investment banks and hedge funds, where algorithmic trading systems (algos) buy and 
sell blocks of financial instruments on incredibly short timescales, often holding a position for a 
second or less.  
When the final report on the Flash Crash was finally published, it stated that the trigger-event for 
the crash was a single block-sale of $4.1bn worth of futures contracts, executed with uncommon 
urgency on behalf of a fund-management company. It was argued that the consequences of that 
trigger event interacting with algos rapidly buying and selling shares rippled out to cause the 
system-level failures.   
The Flash Crash is an example of the kind of large-scale system failure that can arise as a 
consequence of software actions. The ‘failure’ was not caused by software bugs - rather, the 
interactions of independently-managed software systems created conditions that were unforeseen 
by any of the owners and developers of the trading systems. This led to a failure in the broader, 
socio-technical markets in which the algorithmic trading systems are used.   
Our economy and society is becoming increasingly dependent on complex IT systems that are 
created by integrating and orchestrating independently managed software systems. We argue here 
that the incredible increase in scale and complexity in such systems means that we need new 
software engineering techniques that can help us cope with the inherent complexity in these 
systems. Without these, failures like the Flash Crash will become increasingly common and may 
have large-scale societal effects.  In this article, we explain that there are principled reasons why 
current software engineering cannot scale and we propose a research and education agenda to help 
us address the problems of large-scale complex, IT systems engineering. 
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2.  Coalitions of systems 
The key factor that characterises large, complex IT systems is that these systems are assembled 
from other existing and new systems, which are independently controlled and managed. Current 
software engineering research and practice has paid little attention to the issues involved and the 
most relevant background work comes from the discipline of systems engineering. Systems 
engineering focuses on the development of systems as a whole, as defined by the International 
Council for Systems Engineering (INCOSE) 
(http://www.incose.org/practice/whatissystemseng.aspx): 
“Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty groups into a team effort forming 
a structured development process that proceeds from concept to production to operation. Systems 
Engineering considers both the business and the technical needs of all customers with the goal of 
providing a quality product that meets the user needs.” 
 
Systems engineering emerged to take an overall system-wide perspective on complex engineered 
systems involving structures, electrical and mechanical systems. Now almost all systems are 
‘software-intensive’ and the problems of constructing ultra-large scale software systems are being 
addressed by this community (Sillitto, 2010). 
Work from systems engineering that is particularly relevant to this paper is ‘system of systems‘ 
(SoS) research (Maier, 1998). Maier argues that the distinction between a system of systems and a 
complex monolithic system is that the elements of a SoS are operationally and managerially 
independent. He presents a characterization of different types of SoS from directed (systems 
developed for a particular purpose) to virtual (systems that lack a central management authority or 
centrally-agreed purpose).  
Unfortunately, terminology in this area can be confusing. Our view is that the use of the term 
‘system’ implies that, irrespective of the components, the entity that is created is purposeful 
(Checkland, 1981) – intentionally designed to serve some organizational purpose or need.  This is 
consistent with the definition of system of systems proposed by the US Department of Defense 
(DoD, 2008): 
“An SoS is defined as a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful 
systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities” 
The implication is that an SoS is created by a single organization (e.g. the US Air Force) that 
integrates internal and external systems to do something that serves some purpose for that specific 
organization. There is an ‘owner’ of the whole system who has at least some influence over the 
constituent systems and who can certainly decide which systems are components of the SoS.  
The interacting algos that led to the Flash Crash are owned by different organisations and may be 
systems of systems in their own right. They serve the different purposes of their owners and they 
only cooperate because they have to. The owners of the individual organizational systems are often 
competing and may be mutually hostile. Each system jealously guards its own information and may 
change without consultation with any other systems.   
In Maier’s terms, the collection of systems that led to the Flash Crash would be called a ‘virtual 
system of systems’. However, the prefix ‘virtual’ is not consistent with other common usage of that 
term e.g. ‘virtual machines’.     
Rather than using the unintuitive term ‘virtual system of systems’, we propose an alternative 
namely ‘coalition of systems’. A coalition of systems is a collection of systems that work together, 
sometimes reluctantly, because it is in their mutual interest to do so. Coalitions of systems are not 
explicitly designed but come into existence when different systems interact according to agreed 
protocols. Like political coalitions, there may be hostility between the members and members may 
enter and leave the coalition according to their interpretation of what is in their best interests. 
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Coalitions of software systems make software engineering particularly challenging. We can’t 
design dependability into the coalition as there is no overall design authority; nor can we control 
the behaviour of individual systems. The systems in the coalition may change unpredictably, may 
be completely replaced and the organizations running these systems may themselves go out of 
existence. Coalition ‘design’ involves designing the protocols for communications and each 
organization using the coalition orchestrate the constituent systems in their own way. However, the 
designers and managers of each individual system have to consider how to make their systems 
robust enough to ensure that their organizations are not threatened by failures or any undesirable 
behaviour elsewhere in the coalition.  
By analogy with Rittel and Weber’s notion of ‘wicked problems’ (1973), coalitions of systems can 
be thought of as ‘wicked systems’ (Metcalfe, 2004). Wicked problems are impossible to 
completely understand as they change as we attempt to address the problem. ‘Wicked systems’, 
similarly, are constantly changing as they are developed and used and are impossible to understand 
completely.  
 
3.  IT System complexity 
The complexity of a system stems from the number and type of relationships between the system 
components and between the system and its environment. If there are a relatively small number of 
relationships between system components and these change relatively slowly over time then we can 
develop deterministic models of the system and make predictions of its properties.   
However, when there are many dynamic relationships between the elements in a system then we 
have a complex system. Complex systems are non-deterministic and system characteristics cannot 
be predicted by analysis of the system constituents. These characteristics emerge when the whole 
system is put into use and they change over time, depending on how the system is used and the 
system’s external environment. 
Dynamic relationships include relationships between system elements and the system’s 
environment that change. For example, a trust relationship is a dynamic relationship. Initially, 
component A may not trust component B so, after some interchange, A checks that B has 
performed as expected. Over time, these checks may be reduced in scope as A’s trust in B 
increases. However, some failure in B may then profoundly influence that trust and after failure, 
even more stringent checks may be introduced. 
Complexity that stems from the dynamic relationships between the elements in a system is 
‘inherent complexity’ – it depends on the number, existence and nature of these relationships. We 
cannot analyse inherent complexity during system development as it depends on the system’s 
dynamic operating environment.  Coalitions of systems whose elements are large software systems 
will always be inherently complex. The relationships between the elements of the coalition change 
because they are not independent of the ways that the constituent systems are used and their 
operating environments. Consequently, the non-functional and, often, the functional behaviour of 
coalitions of systems is emergent and impossible to completely predict. 
However, even when the relationships between system elements are simpler, relatively static and, 
in principle, understandable, there may be so many elements and relationships that understanding 
these relationships is practically impossible. This type of complexity is ‘epistemic complexity’ – it 
stems from our lack of knowledge about the system rather than inherent system characteristics 
(Rushby, 2009).  For example, it may be possible in principle to deduce the traceability 
relationships between requirements and design but, if the appropriate tools are not available, then it 
may be practically impossible to do so.  
If you don’t know enough about a system’s components and their relationships, you cannot make 
predictions about it, even if that system does not have dynamic relationships between its elements. 
Epistemic complexity increases with the size of the system – as we build larger and larger systems, 
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it is inevitable that they will become harder to understand and their behaviour and properties will 
be harder to predict. 
This distinction between inherent and epistemic complexity is important. As we discuss in the 
following section, we believe that it is the primary reason why we need new approaches to software 
engineering. 
4.  Reductionism and software engineering 
In some respects, software engineering has been incredibly successful. Compared to the systems 
that were being built in the 1970s and 1980s, modern software is much larger, considerably more 
reliable and often developed more quickly. Software products deliver astonishing functionality for 
relatively low prices.  
Software engineering has focused on reducing and managing epistemic complexity so, where 
inherent complexity is relatively low and, critically, where a single organization controls all 
elements of the system, software engineering is very effective. However, we argue that for 
coalitions of systems with a high degree of inherent complexity, current software engineering 
techniques are inadequate. 
We see this in the failures that are common in large government-funded projects. The software is 
delivered late, is more expensive to develop than anticipated and does not meet the needs of its 
users. An example of such a project was the automation of health records in the UK where the 
project was abandoned after 10 years of development. Estimates of the costs of this failure range 
from 5 to 10 billion dollars. 
We argue that there is a fundamental reason why current software engineering cannot effectively 
manage inherent complexity, with the consequence that our software engineering methods are 
unsuitable for building 21st century wicked systems. To understand this, we need to examine the 
essential ‘divide-and conquer’ reductionist assumption that is the basis for modern engineering. 
Reductionism is a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, 
and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituents. From an engineering 
perspective, this means that you should design a system so that it is composed of discrete, smaller 
parts and define interfaces that allow these parts to work together. You then build the system 
elements and integrate these to create the desired system.   
Researchers in software engineering generally adopt this reductionist assumption and their work 
has either been around finding better ways to decompose problems or systems (e.g. work in 
Owners of a system 
control its development 
Decisions made rationally, 
driven by technical criteria 
Definable problem and 
clear system boundaries 
No single 
owner or 
controller 
Decisions driven 
by political 
motives 
Wicked problem 
and constantly 
renegotiated 
system boundaries 
Reductionist assumptions 
Control Rationality Problem definition 
Wicked systems reality 
Figure 1: Reductionist assumptions and wicked systems 
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software architecture), better ways to create the parts of the system (e.g. object-oriented 
techniques) or better ways of system integration (e.g. test-first development). 
There are three fundamental reductionist assumptions that underlie software engineering methods 
and techniques as shown in Figure 1: 
1. Owners of a system control its development.  A reductionist perspective takes the view that 
there is an ultimate controller who has the authority to take decisions about a system and 
who can therefore ‘enforce’ decisions on, for example, how components should interact. 
However, when systems are composed of independently owned and managed elements, there 
is no such owner or controller and there is no central authority to make or enforce design 
decisions. 
2. Decisions are made rationally and are driven by technical criteria. In fact, decision making 
in organizations is profoundly influenced by political considerations where actors in the 
organization strive to maintain or improve their current position or avoid losing face. 
Technical considerations are rarely the most significant factor in large system decision 
making.  
3. There is a definable problem and clear system boundaries. The nature of ‘wicked problems’ 
is that the ‘problem’ is constantly changing depending on the perception of stakeholders and 
external events. The system boundaries are influenced by both these changes and the status 
and perspectives of stakeholders. As these change, the boundaries are redefined. 
For wicked systems, these assumptions are never true and many software project ‘failures’, where 
software is delivered late and over-budget, are a consequence of adherence to this reductionist view 
of the world. To help us address inherent complexity, software engineering must evolve to look 
outwards and to embrace the other systems, people and organizations that make up the software 
systems’ environment. We need to represent, analyze, model and simulate potential operational 
environments for coalitions of systems to help us understand and manage, so far as is it is possible 
to do so, the complex relationships in the coalition. 
 
5.  Challenges for research and education 
There are initiatives in the US and in Europe that are starting to address the problem of engineering 
large, complex, coalitions of systems. In this US, the influential SEI report (Northrop et. al 2006) 
on Ultra-Large Scale Systems (ULSS) has triggered research at the SEI and has led to the creation 
of ULSSIS, a research consortium involving Virginia, Michigan State, Vanderbilt Universities and 
UCSD. In the UK, the Large-Scale Complex IT systems (LSCITS) initiative is addressing 
problems of both inherent and epistemic complexity in large-scale IT systems and Hillary Sillitto 
from Thales is considering design principles for ULSS (2010).   
Northrop et al. have made the point that we need to go beyond incremental improvements to 
current methods and have identified research areas that are important for ULSS namely  human 
interaction, computational emergence, design, computational engineering, adaptive system 
infrastructure, adaptable and predictable system quality and policy, acquisition and management. 
Their report suggests that it is essential to deploy expertise from a range of disciplines to address 
these problems.  
We are in complete agreement that the research required is inter-disciplinary and that incremental 
improvements in existing techniques will be insufficient to address future software engineering 
challenges. However, ‘breakthroughs’ in engineering research are uncommon and take many years 
to be exploited. Across the world, we are now engineering large complex software systems and so 
there is also a need for a more immediate, perhaps more incremental, research, driven by the 
practical problems of complex IT systems engineering. 
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Part of this will involve developing and extending current software engineering methods. Epistemic 
complexity will continue to increase as software systems get larger and larger and we need 
software engineering techniques, such as formal analysis and modelling, to help deal with this. But 
most of the work has to focus on the challenges posed by complexity.  
5.1 A research agenda for software engineering 
The engineering of coalitions of systems involves the engineering of individual systems so that 
they can work effectively in a coalition and the orchestration and configuration of a coalition of 
systems to meet some organizational needs.  Based on the ideas in the ULSS book and our own 
experience in the UK LSCITS initiative, we have identified the ‘top-10’ problems that define a 
research agenda for future software systems engineering.  
1. How can we model and simulate the interactions between independent systems?  
 To help us understand and manage coalitions of systems we need dynamic models that are 
updated in real-time with information from the actual system. We need these models to help 
us make rapid ‘what-if’ assessments of the consequences of system change options. This will 
require new performance and failure modelling techniques where the models can adapt 
automatically from system monitoring data. Of course, we are not suggesting that 
simulations can be complete or can predict all possible problems. However, other 
engineering disciplines have benefited enormously from simulation and we believe that 
comparable benefits might be achieved for software engineering. 
2. How can we monitor coalitions of systems and what are the warning signs of problems? 
 In the run-up to the Flash Crash there were no indicators that might have indicated that the 
system was tending towards an unstable state. To help avoid the transition to an unstable 
system state, we need to know what are the indicators that provide information about the 
state of the coalition of systems, how these indicators may be used to provide both early 
warnings of system problems and, if necessary, switch to safe-mode operating conditions 
that will stop damage occurring. To make effective use of this data, we need visualization 
techniques that reveal the subtleties of coalition operation and interactions to operators and 
users.  
3. How can systems be designed to recover from failure? 
 A fundamental principle of software engineering is that we should build systems so that they 
do not ‘fail’. This has led to the development of methods and tools based on fault avoidance, 
fault detection and fault tolerance.   
 However, as we construct coalitions of systems with independently-managed elements and 
negotiated requirements, it is increasingly impractical to avoid ‘failure’. Indeed, what seems 
to be a ‘failure’ for some users may not affect some others.  Because some failures are 
ambiguous, automated systems cannot cope on their own. Human operators have to use 
information from the system and intervene to recover from the failure and restore the system. 
This means that we need to understand the socio-technical processes of failure recovery, the 
support that these operators need and how to design coalition members to be ‘good citizens’ 
and to support failure recovery. 
4. How can we integrate socio-technical factors into systems and software engineering 
methods? 
 Software and systems engineering methods have been created to support the development of 
technical systems and, by and large, consider human, social and organisational issues to be 
outside the system boundary. However, these non-technical factors significantly affect the 
development, integration and operation of coalitions of systems. There is a considerable 
body of work on socio-technical systems but this has not been ‘industrialised’ and made 
accessible to practitioners. A recent paper (Baxter and Sommerville, 2010) surveys this work 
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and proposes a route to industrial use of socio-technical methods. However, much more 
research and experience is required before socio-technical analyses can be routinely used for 
complex systems engineering.   
5. To what extent can coalitions of systems be self-managing? 
 The coalitions of systems that will be created are complex and dynamic and it will be 
difficult to keep track of system operation and respond in a timely way to the monitoring and 
health measurement information that is provided. We need research into self-management so 
that systems can detect changes in both their own operation and in their operational 
environment and dynamically reconfigure themselves to cope with these changes. The 
danger is that reconfiguration will create further problems so a key requirement is for these 
techniques to operate in a safe, predictable and auditable way and to ensure that self-
management does not conflict with ‘design for recovery’. 
6. How can we manage complex, dynamically changing system configurations? 
 Coalitions of systems will be constructed by orchestration and configuration and the desired 
system configurations will change dynamically in response to load, indicators of the system 
health, unavailability of components and system health warnings. We need ways of 
supporting construction by configuration, managing configuration changes and recording 
changes (including automated changes from the self-management system) in real-time so 
that we have an audit trail recording what the configuration of the coalition was at any point 
in time.  
7. How can we support the agile engineering of coalitions of systems? 
 The business environment changes incredibly quickly in response to economic 
circumstances, competition and business reorganization. The coalitions of systems that we 
create will have to change rapidly to reflect new business needs. A model of system change 
that relies on lengthy processes of requirements analysis and approval simply will not work. 
 Agile methods of programming have been successful for small to medium sized systems 
where the dominant activity is system development. For large and complex systems, 
development processes are often dominated by coordination activities involving multiple 
stakeholders and engineers who are not co-located. How can we evolve agile approaches that 
are effective for ‘systems development in the small’ to support multi-organization, global 
software development? 
8. How should coalitions of systems be regulated and certified? 
 Many coalitions of systems will be critical systems whose failure could threaten individuals, 
organizations and economies. They may have to be certified by a regulator who will check 
that, as far as possible, the systems will not pose a threat to their operators or the wider 
systems’ environment. But certification is increasingly expensive. For some safety-critical 
systems the cost of certification may exceed the costs of development. These costs will 
continue to rise as systems become larger and more complex.  
 Although certification as currently practised is almost certainly impossible for coalitions of 
systems, there is an urgent need for research that allows for incremental and evolutionary 
certification so that our ability to deploy critical complex systems is not curtailed by the 
certification requirements. This is a social as well as a technical issue – our societies have to 
decide what level of certification is socially and legally acceptable. 
9. How can we do ‘probabilistic verification’ of systems? 
 Our current techniques of system testing and more formal analysis are based on the 
assumption that the system has a definitive specification and that behaviour which deviates 
from that specification can be recognized. Coalitions of systems will have no such 
specification nor will system behaviour be guaranteed to be deterministic. The key 
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verification issue will not be ‘is the system correct’ but ‘what is the probability that it 
satisfies essential properties, such as safety, that take into account its probabilistic, real-time 
and non-deterministic behaviour’ (Kwaitowska et al., 2009; Ge at al.,  2010). 
10. How should shared knowledge in a coalition of systems be represented? 
 We assume that the systems in a coalition will interact through service interfaces so there 
will not be any over-arching controller in the system. Information will be encoded in a 
standards-based representation.  The key problem will not therefore be a problem of 
compatibility – it will be a problem of understanding what the information that systems 
exchange actually means.  
 Currently, we address this problem on a system by system basis with negotiations taking 
place between system owners to clarify what shared information means. However, if we 
allow for dynamic coalitions with systems entering and leaving the coalition, this is no 
longer a practical approach.  The key issue is developing a means of sharing the meaning of 
information – perhaps using ontologies as proposed in the work on the semantic web 
(Antoniou and Van Harmelan, 2008). 
A major problem that researchers face is a lack of knowledge of what currently happens in real 
systems. High-profile failures, such as the Flash Crash, lead to enquiries but we need more 
information about the practical difficulties faced by developers and operators of coalitions of 
systems and how they cope with problems that arise.  New ideas, tools and methods, need to be 
supported by long-term empirical studies of these systems and their development processes to 
provide a solid information base to inform research and innovation.   
The LSCITS project (Cliff et al. 2010; Cliff and Northrop, 2011) is tackling some of these issues. 
We are working with partners from the computer industry, financial services and healthcare to 
develop an understanding of the fundamental systems engineering problems that they face.  We 
have a long-term engagement with the UK body that manages national healthcare data who need to 
create coalitions of systems for external access and analysis of the vast amounts of data involved. 
We are developing practical techniques of socio-technical systems engineering (Baxter and 
Sommerville, 2010) and are exploring the problems of designing for failure (Sommerville, 2008). 
We have developed practical and predictable techniques for autonomic system management 
(Calinescu and Kwiatkowska, 2009, Calinescu et al, 2011) and are investigating the scaling-up of 
agile methods (Paige et al., 2008). We are exploring possibilities for incremental system 
certification (Ge et al., 2010) and are working on the development of techniques for system 
simulation and modelling. 
5.2 Education 
To help us address the practical issues of creating, managing and operating wicked systems, we 
need engineers who are equipped with knowledge and understanding of the challenges posed by 
these systems and with techniques that lie outside a ‘normal’ software or systems engineering 
education.  
In the UK, we are providing graduate student education with a new kind of doctoral degree, 
comparable in standard to a PhD. Our students get an Engineering Doctorate (EngD) in Large-scale 
complex IT systems, (University of York, 2009) where the key differences between an EngD and a 
PhD are: 
1. Students have to work on an industrial problem and spend a significant period of time 
working in industry on that problem. Universities simply cannot replicate the complexity of 
modern software-intensive systems and few faculty have experience and understanding of 
these systems. 
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2. Students take a range of courses that focus on complexity and systems engineering such as 
systems engineering for LSCITS, socio-technical systems, high-integrity systems 
engineering, empirical methods and technology innovation.  
3. Students don’t have to produce a conventional ‘thesis’ – a book on a single topic but can 
produce a portfolio of work around their selected area. This is a better reflection of the 
reality of work in industry and makes it easier for the topic to evolve as systems change and 
new research emerges. 
However, graduating a few advanced doctoral students is simply not enough. Universities and 
industry now need to work together to create Masters courses that educate complex systems 
engineers for the 21st century. Figure 2 sets out our thoughts on what might be covered in such 
courses. We understand that a comparable course in ULSS is being developed at Queens University 
in Canada but, at the time of writing, no details on this are available. 
Masters courses in this area have to be multidisciplinary, bringing together engineering and 
business disciplines. It is not only the knowledge that these disciplines bring that is important. It is 
also critical that students are sensitised to the perspectives of different disciplines and so move out 
of the silo of single discipline thinking. 
6.  Conclusions 
Since the advent of widespread networking in the 1990s, our societies have grown increasingly 
dependent on complex software-intensive systems. Serious failures of these systems will have 
profound social and economic consequences. As Sillitto (2010) says, we are building these systems 
without an understanding of how to analyze their behaviour and without appropriate engineering 
principles to support their construction.  
We have argued here that there are fundamental reasons why existing approaches cannot be 
‘scaled-up’ to create coalitions of systems and that incremental improvements to today’s methods 
are not enough to cope with complexity. Put bluntly, existing software engineering is not good 
enough. We need to think differently to address the urgent and growing need for new engineering 
approaches that can help us construct complex systems that we can trust. 
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Sidebar: Socio-technical systems 
Engineers are primarily concerned with building technical systems with hardware and software 
components. They assume that the system requirements reflect the organizational needs for 
integration with other systems, compliance and business processes. Yet, when we consider systems 
in use, these are not simply technical systems but ‘socio-technical systems’. To reflect the fact that 
these are evolving and interacting communities that include technical, human and organisational 
elements, these are sometimes called ‘socio-technical ecosystems’. However, the term ‘socio-
technical systems’ is one that is more commonly used. 
Socio-technical systems are organizational systems that include people and processes as well as 
technological systems. The process definitions set out the intentions of the system designers as to 
how the system should be used but, in reality, the people in the system interpret and adapt these in 
a range of different ways depending on their education, experience and culture. Individual and 
group behaviours also depend on organizational rules and regulations as well as ‘organizational 
culture’ – ‘the way we do things around here’. 
An over-simplification that has hindered software engineering for many years is that it is possible 
to consider technical software-intensive systems that are intended to support work in an 
organization in isolation. The so-called ‘system requirements’ are the interface between the 
technical system and the wider socio-technical system yet we know that requirements are 
inevitably incomplete, incorrect and out of date.  
Coalitions of systems cannot operate on this basis. Rather, we must recognize that these are rich 
socio-technical systems and by taking advantage of the abilities and inventiveness of people we can 
create more effective and more resilient systems. 
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